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R&D Networks Among Unionized Firms 
 
Summary 
We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will 
affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic 
industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always 
pairwise stable and the partially connected network is stable if and only if spillovers are 
large enough. If spillovers are small, the complete network is the efficient network; 
otherwise, the efficient network is the partially connected network. Thus, a conflict 
between stability and efficiency may occur: efficient networks are pairwise stable, but 
the reverse is not true. Strong stability even reinforces this conflict. However, once 
unions settle wages such conflict disappears: the complete network is the unique 
pairwise and strongly stable network and is the efficient network whatever the 
spillovers. 
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Traditionally, the theoretical literature has emphasized the role of trade unions in dis-
torting relative prices and the empirical studies have concentrated on the determinants of
union membership and on the eﬀects of unions on wages and proﬁtability. More recently,
economists have shifted their attention to the long-term eﬀects of trade unions, that is, on
investment, technology and productivity growth. Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003)
have provided a survey of the economic literature on the impact of trade unions on innova-
tion and R&D. The eﬀects of unions on innovation are generally ambiguous both in theory
and in empirical practice. There does, however, seem to be some emerging consensus that
there is a negative association between unions and R&D in North America (see Acs and
Audretsch (1988), Betts, Odgers and Wilson (2001)). This is not the case for Europe
where no such relationship is found (see Schnabel and Wagner (1992), Menezes-Filho,
Ulph and Van Reenen (1998)). Despite this evidence, there has not been to date a study
of the impact of trade unions on research collaborations between ﬁrms in the theoretical
literature on R&D in industries with market power.
Many markets are characterized by inter-ﬁrm collaboration in R&D activity.1 Goyal
and Moraga-González (2001) have analyzed the incentives for R&D collaboration between
horizontally related ﬁrms that are not unionized. In a three-ﬁrm market for a homoge-
neous good, they have basically shown that a conﬂict between the incentives of ﬁrms to
collaborate and social welfare is likely to occur.2 The purpose of this paper is to go beyond
their analysis by making endogenous the wage formation.
In this paper we address the following questions:
(i) When the industry is unionized, what are the incentives of ﬁrms to collaborate and
what is the architecture of "stable" networks of collaboration?
(ii) Do unions reconcile individual incentives to collaborate and social welfare?
To answer these questions we develop a four-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms form
pairwise collaboration links. The purpose of these collaboration links is to share R&D
knowledge about a cost-reducing technology. The collection of pairwise links between the
ﬁrms deﬁnes a network of collaboration. In the second stage, each ﬁrm chooses indepen-
dently and simultaneously a level of eﬀort in R&D. In the third stage, wages are settled at
the ﬁrm-level. By tractability, we consider two extreme cases of wage formation: (i) each
ﬁrm chooses its own wage (or there is no union), which is our benchmark; (ii) each union
1See Hagedoorn (2002) who has provided a survey of emprical work on R&D collaboration among ﬁrms.
2Beside the asymmetric situation among three ﬁrms, Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) have analyzed
symmetric networks, i.e. networks in which all n ﬁrms maintain the same number of collaborative ties.
1chooses the wage, which is the monopoly-union model. The wages and the R&D eﬀorts,
along with the network of collaboration, deﬁne the costs of the ﬁrms. In the fourth stage,
ﬁrms compete in the oligopolistic market, taking as given the costs of production.
R&D eﬀort of a ﬁrm decreases its marginal cost of production. It has also positive
spillovers on the costs of ﬁrms that are linked to the ﬁrm that undertakes R&D eﬀort. We
distinguish between direct and indirect R&D collaborations. For instance, suppose ﬁrms
1a n d2c o l l a b o r a t ei nR & D ,ﬁ r m s2a n d3c o l l a b o r a t ei nR & D ,w h i l eﬁ r m s1a n d3d on o t
collaborate. Then, we say that ﬁrms 1 and 2 (2 and 3) have a direct R&D collaboration,
while ﬁrms 1 and 3 have an indirect R&D collaboration. Knowledge spillovers from direct
R&D collaborations are partially absorbed. Spillovers from indirect collaborations are not
excluded but are smaller than those obtained from direct R&D collaborations. Moreover,
the spillover from indirect collaborations deteriorates in the distance of the relationship.
Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) do not assume that spillovers across collaborating
ﬁrms are related to the distance between ﬁrms in the collaborating network. They assume
that the research knowledge of a direct collaboration is fully absorbed, while the research
knowledge of a no direct collaboration (indirect collaboration or no collaboration at all)
is partially absorbed (public spillovers).
A number of theoretical arguments as well as some empirical ﬁndings suggest that
knowledge spillovers are concentrated in spatial proximity from their respective source.
Empirical evidence that knowledge spillovers are concentrated in spatial proximity to
the respective source is provided in Acs, Audretsch and Feldman (1992), Audretsch and
Feldman (1996), Anselin, Varga and Acs (1997) and Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg and Henderson
(1993). The theoretical explanation is based on the notion that in most cases face-to-face-
contacts are necessary for transferring tacit knowledge. Fritsch and Franke (2004) have
analyzed the impact of spillovers on innovation activities in a German region and examine
the signiﬁcance of R&D cooperation for these knowledge spillovers. They demonstrate
that signiﬁcant diﬀerences between regions exist with regard to the productivity of R&D
activities. These interregional diﬀerences can be explained by R&D spillovers from other
R&D activities by actors located in the same region. They also ﬁnd that R&D cooperation
plays only a minor role as a medium for knowledge spillovers. Apparently, cooperative
relationships, as such, do not lead to those kinds of knowledge spillovers that are important
for the eﬃciency of innovation activities. In this sense, it seems that spillovers from direct
R&D collaborations could not be perfect and that spillovers from indirect collaborations
are smaller than those obtained from direct R&D collaborations. Moreover, spillovers from
indirect collaborations deteriorates in the distance of the relationship.3
3As in the connections model studied by Bala and Goyal (2000) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
2A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long
run is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that agents not beneﬁt from altering
the structure of the network. A weak version of such condition is the pairwise stability
notion deﬁned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is pairwise stable if no agent
beneﬁts from severing one of their links and no other two agents beneﬁt from adding a link
between them, with one beneﬁting strictly and the other at least weakly. But, pairwise
stability considers only deviations by at most a pair of agents at a time. It might be that
some group of agents could all be made better oﬀ by some complicated reorganization of
their links, which is not accounted for under pairwise stability. The deﬁnition of strong
stable networks allows for larger coalitions than just pairs of agents to deviate, and is due
to Jackson and van den Nouweland (2004). A strongly stable network is a network which
is stable against changes in links by any coalition of agents.4
In a three-ﬁrm market for a homogeneous good, there are four possible network archi-
tectures: the complete network, the star network, the partially connected network, and the
empty network. In the complete network every pair of ﬁrms is linked. The star network is
a network in which there is a "hub" ﬁrm directly linked to every other ﬁrm, while none of
the other ﬁrms have a direct link with each other. The partially connected network refers
to a conﬁguration in which two ﬁrms are linked while the third ﬁrm is isolated. In the
empty network there are no collaboration links. We ﬁnd that, whenever ﬁrms settle wages,
the complete network is always pairwise stable while the partially connected network is
stable if and only if spillovers are large enough. Indeed, smaller spillovers destabilize the
partially connected network rapidly. The intuition behind this is that the stability of
the partially connected network relies on the great cost asymmetry existing between the
linked ﬁrms and the isolated ﬁrm. It is this asymmetry that discourages a linked ﬁrm
from forming a link with the isolated ﬁrm, for large spillovers. As spillovers decrease,
this asymmetry reduces, and that destabilizes the partially connected network. However,
the complete network is the eﬃcient network if spillovers are small, while the partially
connected network is the eﬃcient network if spillovers are large. Thus, a conﬂict between
stability and eﬃciency may occur: eﬃcient networks are pairwise stable, but the reverse
is not true. Moreover, the concept of strong stability even reinforces this conﬂict: eﬃcient
networks are not always strongly stable.
But, once unions settle wages such conﬂict disappears: the complete network is the
unique pairwise and strongly stable network and is the eﬃcient network whatever the
spillovers. When ﬁrms settle wages, the isolated ﬁrm in the partially connected network
will tend to be pushed out of the market as spillovers become very large. However,
4Jackson (2003, 2004) provides surveys of models of network formation.
3when unions settle wages, a large share of the beneﬁts of the linked ﬁrms thanks to
cost reductions due to R&D collaborations goes to the unions which diminishes their
competitive advantage with respect to the isolated ﬁrm. As a consequence, collaborating
ﬁrms have less incentives to make R&D, meanwhile the isolated ﬁrm may even make more
R&D eﬀort in presence of unions. In fact unionization reduces considerably the asymmetry
between the linked ﬁrms and the isolated ﬁrm. Thus, unionization destabilizes the partially
connected network making the complete network the unique pairwise and strongly stable
network. Moreover, social welfare is increasing with the number of collaborative links, and
hence, the complete network is the eﬃcient network.
For each network architecture (except the partially connected network), we ﬁnd that
unions reduce research outputs, proﬁts and quantities. In case of the partially connected
network, unions reduces research outputs, proﬁts and quantities of collaborating ﬁrms.
However, unions reduce research outputs, proﬁts and quantities of the isolated ﬁrm only
if spillovers are very weak. Thus, there is no linear relationship between unions and R&D
eﬀort. This relationship depends on the network architecture and on the spillovers.
Before presenting the model, it is worth to mention some related literature. Goyal
and Joshi (2003) have studied networks of collaboration between oligopolistic ﬁrms that
are not unionized.5 They assume that a collaboration link between two ﬁrms involves a
ﬁxed cost and leads to an exogenously speciﬁed reduction in marginal cost of production.
By contrast, in Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) and in our paper the costs of forming
links are taken to be negligible, and ﬁrms decide independently on a level of R&D, which
in turns determines the level of cost reduction endogenously. For general background on
R&D cooperation in oligopoly the reader is directed to Amir (2000), d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988), Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992), Katz (1986) and Suzumura (1992).
Finally, Yi and Shin (2000) have analyzed the endogenous formation of research coalitions
where coalition formation is modelled in terms of a coalition structure, which is a partition
of the set of ﬁrms. But the restriction to partitions is a strong one indeed if our interest
is in research collaborations, since it rules out situations in which, for example, ﬁrms 1
and 2 have a bilateral research agreement and ﬁrms 2 and 3 have a similar agreement but
there is no agreement between 1 and 3. When this occurs, it is not appropriate to view
ﬁrms 1, 2 and 3 as one coalition, and we cannot think of 1 and 2 and 2 and 3 being two
distinct coalitions, since this violates the mutual exclusiveness property of coalitions. The
theory of networks provides a natural way to think of such issues, since it allows for such
intransitive relationships.
5Recently, Goyal, Konovalov and Moraga-González (2003) have developed a model of R&D competition
and collaboration in which individual ﬁrms carry out independent in-house research and also undertake
joint research projects with other ﬁrms.
4The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3
we analyze the stability and eﬃciency of R&D networks, and we comment the aggregate
performance of networks. In Section 4 we conclude.
2 The model
We develop a four-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms form pairwise collaboration links.
In the second stage, each ﬁrm chooses a level of eﬀort in R&D. In the third stage, wages
are settled at the ﬁrm-level. The wages and the R&D eﬀorts, along with the network of
collaboration, deﬁne the costs of the ﬁrms. In the fourth stage, ﬁrms compete in quantities
in the oligopolistic market, taking as given the costs of production.
We consider a market for a homogeneous commodity produced by 3 identical proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms. We denote by N = {1,2,3} the set of ﬁrms which are connected in a
network of R&D collaboration. Let qi denote the quantities of the commodity produced by
ﬁrm i ∈ N.L e tP(Q)=a−Q be the market-clearing price when aggregate quantity on the
market is Q ≡
 
i∈N qi. More precisely, P(Q)=a−Q for Q<a ,a n dP(Q)=0otherwise,
with a>0. The ﬁrms can undertake R&D to look for cost reducing innovations. The
innovation technology is produced under decreasing returns to scale with the sole input y:
xi =
√
y,w h e r exi is the research output or eﬀort for ﬁrm i ∈ N. It follows that the cost
function for technology is given by
Ci(γ,xi)=γ · (xi)
2 ,( 1 )
where γ is the price of input y.W e s e t γ equal to 1. This assumption suﬃces to en-
sure nonnegativity of all variables. The production technology is modeled as a Leontief
function:
qi =m i n{Li,θi · Ki},( 2 )
where Li is labour, Ki is capital, and θi is the ﬁxed proportion at which the two factors









where wi i st h ew a g ep a i db yﬁ r mi to its workers and r is the price of capital which is
normalized to one, r =1 . Associated with each ﬁrm there is a risk-neutral union. The
workforce for each ﬁrm is drawn from separate pools of labour, and the union objective is
to maximize the economic rent,
Ui(wi,w,Li)=Li ·(wi −w),( 4 )
5where w is the reservation wage. Without loss of generality, the reservation wage is set
equal to zero, w =0 .6
In a network, ﬁrms are the nodes and each link indicates a pairwise R&D collaboration.
Thus, a network g is simply a list of which pair of ﬁrms are linked to each other. If we are
considering a pair of ﬁrms i and j,t h e n{i,j}∈g indicates that i and j are linked under
the network g and that a R&D collaboration is established between ﬁrms i and j.F o r
simplicity, write ij to represent the link {i,j},s oij ∈ g indicates that i and j are linked
under the network g. The network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g
is denoted g + ij and the network obtained by deleting link ij from an existing network
g is denoted g − ij. For any network g,l e tN(g)={i ∈ N |∃j such that ij ∈ g} be
the set of ﬁrms which have at least one link in the network g. Two ﬁrms i and j are
connected if and only if there exists a sequence of ﬁrms i1,...,i K such that ikik+1 ∈ g for
each k ∈{ 1,...,K − 1} with i1 = i and iK = j.L e tNi(g) be the set of ﬁrms which are
connected with i,a n dl e tMi(g) be the set of ﬁrms which have a direct link with i.L e t
G be the set of all possible networks. In this three-ﬁrm market, there are four possible
network architectures: (i) the complete network, gc,i nw h i c he v e r yp a i ro fﬁ r m si sl i n k e d ,
(ii) the star network, gs, in which there is one ﬁrm that is linked to the other two ﬁrms,
(iii) the partially connected network, gp,i nw h i c ht w oﬁ r m sh a v eal i n ka n dt h et h i r dﬁ r m
is isolated, and (iv) the empty network, ge, in which there are no collaboration links. In
the star network, the ﬁrm which is linked to the other two ﬁrms is called the "hub" ﬁrm,
















Figure 1: Four possible network architectures.
6It can be shown that all results are qualitatively robust to this assumption.
6There is a function which relates the research output to the marginal cost of produc-










where spillovers are assumed and measured by two parameters φ and α. The parameter
φ ∈ (0,1] measures the spillovers obtained from R&D collaborations. Spillovers from
indirect collaborations are not excluded but are smaller than those obtained from direct
R&D collaborations, α ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, the spillovers from indirect collaborations
deteriorate in the distance of the relationship. Let t(ij) be the number of links in the
shortest path between i and j (setting t(ij)=∞ if there is no path between i and j).
Given a network g and the collection of research outputs {xi}i∈N, the marginal cost of
production for each ﬁrm i ∈ N becomes
ci(g)=wi +c −xi −
 
k∈Mi(g)





φ · xl.( 6 )
Let
Xi ≡ xi +
 
k∈Mi(g)





φ · xl (7)
be the total cost reduction for ﬁrm i obtained from its own research, xi,a n df r o mt h e
research knowledge of ﬁrms connected with i, which is partially absorbed depending on φ
and α. We refer to this total cost reduction, Xi, as eﬀective R&D output of ﬁrm i.T h e n ,
ci(g)=wi +c−Xi. Notice that in Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) the eﬀective R&D




l/ ∈Mi(g)xl. Only when φ =1and α =0in our
model and µ =0in their model, both models coincide.










7Two distinct ways of modelling knowledge spillovers have emerged. (i) d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) regard leakages in technological know-how as taking place in outputs: each ﬁrm’s ﬁnal cost reduction
is the sum of its autonomously acquired part and a fraction of other ﬁrms’ parts. (ii) Kamien, Muller and
Zang (1992) postulates the presence of a spillover eﬀect on R&D expenses: each ﬁrm’s eﬀective R&D
investment is the sum of its own expenditure and ﬁxed fraction of the sum of other ﬁrms’ expenditures.
Amir (2000) has shown that the two models are not equivalent from a quantitative and qualitative point of
view. Invoking some economic principles, Amir has concluded that the Kamien-Muller-Zang model is fully
valid while the d’Aspremont-Jacquemin model appears to be of questionable validity for large values of the
spillover parameter. However, the d’Aspremont-Jacquemin model may be adequate for certain industries
or R&D processes: for instance, technology parks where the beneﬁts ﬁrms draw from larger R&D spillovers
outweigh the negative eﬀects of increased competition on their proﬁts.
7Wages are settled at the ﬁrm-level. Two extreme cases are considered: (i) each ﬁrm
simultaneously chooses the wage that maximizes proﬁts taken as given the wage chosen
by the other ﬁrms, (ii) each union simultaneously chooses the wage that maximizes the
economic rent taken as given the wage chosen by the other unions.
For any network g, social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of consumer surplus and pro-










Before looking for the stability and eﬃciency of networks, we derive for each possi-
ble network architecture, the equilibrium R&D outputs, quantities produced, proﬁts and
wages. See the Appendix.
In presence of unions, any competitive advantage of your rival have to be shared with
the union. Thus, the competitive advantage due to increasing research eﬀort will be
smaller with unions rather than without unions. For instance, a marginal increase of xj
will reduce j’s marginal cost, but in presence of unions part of the marginal cost (wage)
will increase with xj which partially compensate the reduction in the marginal cost of
capital. We could say that unions make research eﬀorts less "substitutes". In the empty
network ge R&D eﬀorts are always strategic substitutes. In the complete network gc R&D
eﬀorts are strategic substitutes if spillovers are small and become strategic complements
when spillovers are large. However, strategic interactions among R&D eﬀorts of diﬀerent
ﬁrms become complex in the star network gs: (i) R&D eﬀorts of the two "spoke" ﬁrms are
strategic substitutes when ﬁrms settle wages whatever spillovers are; (ii) but when unions
settle wages, R&D eﬀorts of the two "spoke" ﬁrms are strategic substitutes if spillovers
are small and become strategic complements when spillovers are large.; (iii) ﬁnally, R&D
eﬀorts of the "hub" ﬁrm and a "spoke" ﬁrm are strategic substitutes if spillovers are small
and become strategic complements when spillovers are large. In general, unionization
makes it more "likely" that R&D eﬀorts are strategic complements.
Proposition 1 In the empty network ge, the star network gs and the complete network
gc, at equilibrium, (i) unions reduce research outputs, proﬁts and quantities; (ii) unions
increase wages and prices.
In the partial network gp, R&D eﬀorts for the collaborating ﬁrms can also be either
strategic substitutes or complements depending on the spillovers parameter φ. However,
the strategic interaction between R&D eﬀorts of a collaborating ﬁrm and the isolated one
(or the opposite) is of substitution regardless spillovers size and unionization. When ﬁrms
settle wages, the isolated ﬁrm will tend to be pushed out of the market as spillovers become
8larger. But once unions settle wages, part of the beneﬁts due to R&D collaboration goes
to the unions which diminishes their competitive advantage with respect to the isolated
ﬁrm. So as φ goes to one, the isolated ﬁrms will advocate for a unionized industry in order
to avoid being pushed out of the industry.
Proposition 2 In the partial network, gp, at equilibrium, (i) unions reduce research out-
puts, proﬁts and quantities of collaborating ﬁrms; (ii) unions reduce research outputs of
the non-collaborating ﬁrm if and only if spillovers are weak (φ<0.547); (iii) unions re-
duce proﬁts of the non-collaborating ﬁrm if and only if spillovers are weak (φ<0.633);
(iv) unions reduce quantities of the non-collaborating ﬁrm if and only if spillovers are very
weak (φ<0.275);a n d(v) unions increase wages and prices.
In Figure 2 and Figure 3 we plot the individual R&D outputs when ﬁrms settle wages
and unions settle wages, respectively. We observe that, if unions choose wages, then R&D
output of a ﬁrm is decreasing with the number of links the ﬁrm has and with the spillover
parameter φ. If ﬁrms settle wages, then individual R&D output still decreases with the
spillover parameter φ, except for the ﬁrms that collaborate in the partial network and for
the "hub" ﬁrm in the star network. Indeed, the research eﬀort made by the "hub" ﬁrm
may increase or decrease with φ depending on how large spillovers are. As φ goes from
zero to one, research eﬀort ﬁrst increases with φ, then it starts to decrease with φ.B u t ,
the relationship between individual R&D output and the number of links becomes much
more complex. However, aggregate R&D output is decreasing with the spillover parameter
φ and with the number of collaborations, whatever the mode of wage settlement and the
network architecture.
It is also interesting to analyze the evolution of eﬀective R&D since it is a measure of the
reduction in marginal cost. In Figure 4 and Figure 5 we plot eﬀective R&D outputs when
ﬁrms settle wages and unions settle wages, respectively. We observe that, if unions settle
wages, eﬀective R&D output of any ﬁrm (except the isolated ﬁrm in gp)i n c r e a s e sw i t h
the spillover parameter φ, except for very large spillovers. If ﬁrms settle wages, eﬀective
R&D output of any ﬁrm (except ﬁrms in gp) ﬁrst increases with φ,t h e ni td e c r e a s e sw i t h
φ, and reaches a maximum for values of φ close to 1
2. A change in φ has a twofold eﬀect:
it increases the eﬀect of one unit of R&D output on the whole network and reduces the
individual R&D output. Which one of the two eﬀects dominates the other determines the
relationship between eﬀective R&D and φ.































Figure 2: Firms’ R&D outputs when ﬁrms settle wages and α =1 .
































Figure 3: Firms’ R&D outputs when unions settle wages and α =1 .







































Figure 4: Firms’ eﬀective R&D when ﬁrms settle wages and α =1 .








































Figure 5: Firms’ eﬀective R&D when unions settle wages and α =1 .
133 Stability and eﬃciency of R&D networks
3.1 Pairwise stable networks
A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run
is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that agents not beneﬁt from altering the
structure of the network. A weak version of such condition is the pairwise stability notion
deﬁned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is pairwise stable if no agent beneﬁts
from severing one of their links and no other two agents beneﬁt from adding a link between
them, with one beneﬁting strictly and the other at least weakly.
Deﬁnition 1 An e t w o r kg is pairwise stable if
• for all ij ∈ g, Πi(g) ≥ Πi(g −ij) and Πj(g) ≥ Πj(g −ij),a n d
• for all ij / ∈ g,i fΠi(g) < Πi(g +ij) then Πj(g) > Πj(g + ij).
L e tu ss a yt h a tg  is adjacent to g if g  = g + ij or g  = g − ij for some ij.An e t w o r k
g  defeats g if either g  = g −ij and Πi(g ) ≥ Πi(g),o ri fg  = g + ij with Πi(g ) ≥ Πi(g)
and Πj(g ) ≥ Πj(g) with at least one inequality holding strictly. Pairwise stability is
equivalent to saying that a network is pairwise stable if it is not defeated by another
(necessarily adjacent) network. This deﬁnition of stability is quite weak and should be
seen as a necessary condition for strategic stability.
We are interested in the networks of R&D collaboration that emerge in two diﬀerent
settings: (i) ﬁrms choose wages, (ii) unions choose wages. Throughout the paper we use
the symbol f (u) to indicate that the ﬁrm (union) chooses the wage. We ﬁrst study
pairwise stable networks when ﬁrms settle wages.
Proposition 3 Suppose ﬁrms settle wages. (i) The complete network gc is always pairwise
stable, (ii) the partially connected network gp is pairwise stable if and only if spillovers
are large enough, φ ≥   φ(α), (iii) the star and empty networks (respectively, gs and ge)a r e
never pairwise stable.
Proof. First we show that the complete network gc is always pairwise stable. No pair of





j(gs,f) with ij / ∈ gs.L e t












4(14 −(2 +α)φ)(2 +(2+ α)φ)(1 + (5 − 2φ)φ)2(a − c)2
(A1)2
with ij / ∈ gs,i tf o l l o w st h a tgc is pairwise stable. Obviously, the star network gs cannot
be pairwise stable since ﬁrms i and j have incentives to form the link ij / ∈ gs.





j(ge,f) with ij ∈ gp.S i n c e
Π∗
i(gp,f)=








i(ge,f),w i t hi ∈ N(gp),
it follows that ge is not pairwise stable.
Third, the partially connected network gp is pairwise stable if the spillovers are suﬃ-
ciently large. Since the empty network is never pairwise stable, the network gp is pairwise




j(gs,f) with ij / ∈ gp, ij ∈ gs,
and j/ ∈ N(gp).S i n c e
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j(gp,f)=
7(1 −φ)4(a − c)
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4(14 −(2 +α)φ)(2 +(2+ α)φ)(1 + (5 − 2φ)φ)2(a − c)2
(A1)2 ;
gp is pairwise stable if and only if
Π∗
i(gp,f)=






(7 − 2α)(1 + 2φ)(4 + 4(7 −α)φ − (4− α)(2 + α)φ2)2(a −c)2
(A1)2 .
Let   φ(α) be a cutoﬀ function which gives the value of φ such that Π∗
i(gp,f)=Π ∗
i(gs,f),
  φ(α) is decreasing with α, is bounded above by   φ(α =0 )=0 .551, and is bounded below
by   φ(α =1 )=0 .285. Then, gp is pairwise stable if and only if φ ≥   φ(α).
Using Figures 6 and 7 we can study the stability of diﬀerent networks. (i) The empty
network ge is never stable because two ﬁrms have incentives to collaborate. (ii) The
star network gs is never stable, because the "spoke" ﬁrms that have only one link have
incentives to link to each other. Thus, the complete network gc is always pairwise stable.
(iii) Whether the partially connected network gp is stable will depend on spillovers φ and
α. If spillovers are large enough, the isolated ﬁrm has a signiﬁcant cost disadvantage






































Figure 6: Individual ﬁrm proﬁts when ﬁrms settle wages and α =1 .






































Figure 7: Individual ﬁrm proﬁts when ﬁrms settle wages and α =0 .
17and it will tend to be pushed out of the market as spillovers become very large. Thus,
collaborating ﬁrms may decide to keep isolated the third ﬁrm and to divide between them
most of the market letting only a small share to the isolated ﬁrm, rather than forming
a star network by oﬀering a collaboration link to the isolated ﬁrm. On the contrary, if
spillovers are small, collaborating ﬁrms have incentives to link with the isolated ﬁrm in
order to become the "hub" ﬁrm in the star network and to beneﬁt from cost reductions due
to the increase of eﬀective R&D. The gains due to the increase of eﬀective R&D are not
oﬀset by the increase in product competition. The former isolated ﬁrm is more competitive
under the star network because it beneﬁts from direct spillovers from the "hub" ﬁrm and
from indirect spillovers from the other "spoke" ﬁrm.
As φ decreases, the proﬁts of the ﬁrms in the diﬀerent networks become similar, ir-
respective of the network structure (in the limiting case φ → 0 the proﬁts are all equal).
Thus, network structures become more important when direct spillovers are large.8 An-
other observation concerns the impact of spillovers on the stability of diﬀerent networks.
Smaller spillovers (direct and indirect) destabilize the partially connected network rapidly.9
The intuition behind this is that the stability of the partially connected network relies on
the great cost asymmetry existing between the linked ﬁrms and the isolated ﬁrm. It is
this asymmetry that discourages a linked ﬁrm from forming a link with the isolated ﬁrm,
for large direct spillovers and large indirect spillovers. As φ decreases, this asymmetry
reduces, and that destabilizes the partially connected network gp. Moreover, the larger
φ and α are, the smaller the cost asymmetry existing between ﬁrms in the star network
is, and the smaller cost advantage the "hub" ﬁrm has. In contrast, the complete network
remains stable for all values of φ;w en o t eh o w e v e rt h a tt h el o s s e sf r o md e l e t i n gal i n k
diminish as φ decreases and as α increases (in this sense the complete network becomes
more vulnerable with decreasing φ and increasing α).
We now study pairwise stable networks when unions settle wages.
Proposition 4 Suppose unions settle wages. The complete network gc is the unique pair-
wise stable network.
Proof. First we show that the complete network gc is always pairwise stable. No pair of
ﬁrms i and j have incentives to delete their link ij ∈ gc.T h a ti s ,Π∗
i(gc,u) > Π∗
i(gs,u)
8Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) found that network structures are more important when public
spillovers are modest. This is why we assume no public spillovers.
9The smaller the spillovers from indirect collaborations are, the larger the spillovers from direct collab-




j(gs,u) with ij / ∈ gs.L e t
A2 = 4468900 + 9φ(114060 −20060α − 3(11904 −α(302+ 1003α))φ














with ij / ∈ gs,i tf o l l o w st h a tgc is pairwise stable. Obviously, the star network gs cannot
be pairwise stable since ﬁrms i and j have incentives to form the link ij / ∈ gs.





j(ge,u) with ij ∈ gp.S i n c e
Π∗
i(gp,u)=
4004001(151 − 9φ)(73+9φ)(a − c)
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with i ∈ N(gp), it follows that ge is not pairwise stable.





j(gp,u) with ij / ∈ gp, ij ∈ gs and i/ ∈ N(gp). Since we have
Π∗
i(gs,u)=
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9(151− 18φ)(73+ 18φ)(2668 +36(29 −5α)φ − 27(4 −α)(2+ α)φ2)2(a −c)2
(A2)2 ,
with ij / ∈ gp, ij ∈ gs, i/ ∈ N(gp), j ∈ N(gp), gp is never pairwise stable.
Using Figure 8 for α =1we can study the stability of diﬀerent networks. This analysis
goes through for all values of α ∈ [0,1].10 (i) The empty network ge is still never stable.
(ii) The star network gs is never stable either. Indeed, "spoke" ﬁrms that have only one
10Notice that α =1makes the star network less asymmetric than with α<1. If the partially connected
network g
p is not pairwise stable for α =1 , then for sure g
p is not pairwise stable for α<1.




































Figure 8: Individual ﬁrm proﬁts when unions settle wages and α =1 .
20link have still incentives to link to each other. Thus, the complete network gc is pairwise
stable. (iii) But, once the unions settle wages, the partially connected network gp is no
longer stable even when spillovers φ are large. Without unions, the isolated ﬁrm will
tend to be pushed out of the market as spillovers become very large. However, under
unionization, a large share of the beneﬁts of the linked ﬁrms thanks to cost reductions due
to R&D collaborations goes to the unions which diminishes their competitive advantage
with respect to the isolated ﬁrm. As a consequence, collaborating ﬁrms have less incentives
to make R&D, meanwhile the isolated ﬁrm may even make more R&D eﬀort in presence
of unions. Even when φ goes to one the isolated ﬁrm maintains a signiﬁcant market share.
In fact unionization reduces considerably the asymmetry between the linked ﬁrms and
the isolated ﬁrm. Thus, unionization destabilizes gp making gc the unique pairwise stable
network.
3.2 Strongly stable networks
While pairwise stability is natural and quite easy to work with, there are some limitations
of the concept. First, it is a weak notion in that it only considers deviations on a single
link at a time. For instance, it could be that an agent would not beneﬁt from severing
any single link but would beneﬁt from severing several links simultaneously, and yet the
network would still be pairwise stable. Second, pairwise stability considers only deviations
by at most a pair of agents at a time. It might be that some group of agents could all be
made better oﬀ by some complicated reorganization of their links, which is not accounted
for under pairwise stability.
Alternatives to pairwise stability that allow for larger coalitions than just pairs of
agents to deviate were ﬁrst considered by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997). The deﬁnition
of strong stable networks is in that spirit, and is due to Jackson and van den Nouweland
(2004). A strongly stable network is a network which is stable against changes in links by
any coalition of agents.
An e t w o r kg  ∈ G is obtainable from g ∈ G via deviations by S if
(i) ij ∈ g  and ij / ∈ g implies ij ⊂ S,a n d
(ii) ij ∈ g and ij / ∈ g  implies ij ∩S  = ∅.
The above deﬁnition identiﬁes changes in a network that can be made by a coalition
S, without the need of consent of any agents outside of S. Part (i) requires that any new
links that are added can only be between agents in S. This reﬂects the fact that consent
of both agents is needed to add a link. Part (ii) requires that at least one agent of any
21deleted link be in S. This reﬂects the fact that either agent in a link can unilaterally sever
the relationship.
Deﬁnition 2 An e t w o r kg is strongly stable if for any S ⊂ N, g  that is obtainable from
g via deviations by S, and i ∈ S such that Πi(g ) > Πi(g), there exists j ∈ S such that
Πj(g ) < Πj(g).
Strong stability provides a powerful reﬁnement of pairwise stability. The concept of
strong stability mainly makes sense in smaller network situations where agents have sub-
stantial information about the overall structure and potential payoﬀs and can coordinate
their actions. That is, it makes sense to model agreements between ﬁrms in an oligopoly.
Proposition 5 S u p p o s eﬁ r m ss e t t l ew a g e s .I fφ ≥   φ(α) the partially connected network
gp is the unique strongly stable network. Otherwise, no network g ∈ G is strongly stable.
Proof. First, since strong stability is a reﬁnement of pairwise stability, we have that the
empty and star networks are never strongly stable. Second, we show that the complete


















(13 −5φ(2 − φ))
2 .
Third, from Proposition 3 we know that if φ<  φ(α) then the partially connected net-
work is not pairwise stable, and so is not strongly stable; where   φ(α) is a cutoﬀ function
which gives the value of φ such that Π∗
i(gp,f)=Π ∗
i(gs,f),w i t hi ∈ N(gp) and i hav-
ing two links in gs.B u t , i f φ ≥   φ(α),t h e ngp is pairwise stable. Is gp strongly stable
too? Since gp is pairwise stable, it suﬃces to show that no coalition has incentives to add





j(gc,f) with ij ∈ gp as shown above. So, if φ ≥   φ(α) then gp is the unique
strongly stable network, and if φ<  φ(α) then no network is strongly stable.
Since a strongly stable network is a pairwise stable network, the only two candidates
to be strongly stable are gp and gc when ﬁrms settle wages. First, we consider the case
when both gp and gc are pairwise stable. That is, if φ ≥   φ(α).U s i n gF i g u r e s6a n d7w e
see that the complete network gc is not strongly stable because two ﬁrms have incentives
to form a coalition and to delete their links with the third ﬁrm; so moving to the partially
connected network gp. Such deviation was not allowed with pairwise stability. Thus, gp
22is the unique strongly stable network when spillovers are large, φ ≥   φ(α).S e c o n d , w e
consider the case when only gc is pairwise stable. That is, if φ<  φ(α).F r o m F i g u r e s6
and 7 we observe that gc is never strongly stable.
We now consider the situation when unions settle wages.
Proposition 6 Suppose unions settle wages. The complete network gc is the unique
strongly stable network.
Proof. First, since strong stability is a reﬁnement of pairwise stability, we have that the
empty, partially connected and star networks are never strongly stable. Second, we show
that the complete network gc is always strongly stable. From Proposition 4 we know that
the complete network is always pairwise stable. It suﬃces to show that no coalition of
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99207(667− 9φ(10− 3φ))2(a − c)
2
(1117225 −9027φ(10− 3φ))2 ,
we have that Πi(gc) > Πi(gp) > Πi(ge) > Πj(gp),w i t hi ∈ N(gp) and j/ ∈ N(gp),a n ds o
t h ec o m p l e t en e t w o r kgc is strongly stable for φ ∈ (0,1].
Using Figure 8 we observe that gc is strongly stable whatever φ>0 since a coalition
of two ﬁrms never has incentives to form and to delete its links with the third ﬁrm. The
intuition is that unionization again reduces the asymmetry of the partially connected
network gP. Thus, the strongly stable network that will emerge in the long run is diﬀerent
w h e t h e rﬁ r m ss e t t l ew a g e so ru n i o n ss e t t l ew a g e s .
What would happen if unions had a word to say in the decision about R&D collab-
orations? One extreme case is a situation where unions decide about links instead of
ﬁrms. Using Figure 9 we observe that (i) ge, gp,a n dgs are never pairwise, (ii) gc is the
unique pairwise stable network. Is gc strongly stable too? If φ<0.663 then gc is strongly
stable, otherwise no network is strongly stable. We conclude that in terms of network
architecture, ﬁrms and unions aspirations are very close.


























Figure 9: Unions’ rents when α =1 .
243.3 Aggregate performance of networks
We now explore the aggregate performance of diﬀerent networks. In Figure 10 and Fig-
ure 11 we plot the aggregate proﬁts of ﬁrms when ﬁrms settle wages and unions settle
wages, respectively. Remember that the symbol f (u) indicates that ﬁrms (unions) settle




iΠi(gp,f).F i g u r e 1 0
shows that φTP exists and is unique, and reveals that if φ<φ TP then gc is the network
that maximizes aggregate proﬁts when ﬁrms settle wages, otherwise it is gp.N o t i c et h a t
aggregate proﬁts are not always increasing with the number of collaborations. We now
provide some intuition for this pattern. When spillovers are large, the isolated ﬁrm tends
to be pushed out of the market and the collaborating ﬁrms will obtain proﬁts close to
the duopoly case which are greater than those obtained in the complete network where
all ﬁrms have equal market share. As φ → 1 we converge to a situation where in gp two
ﬁrms collaborate in R&D and share the whole market, while in gc three ﬁrms collaborate
in R&D and share the whole market. However, we observe in Figure 11 that the complete
network gc dominates in terms of aggregate proﬁts when unions settle wages. Moreover,
aggregate industry proﬁts are increasing with the number of collaborations and with the
spillover parameter φ.
In Figure 12 and Figure 13 we plot the aggregate production of the industry when ﬁrms
settle wages and unions settle wages, respectively. Deﬁne φQ1 as the solution to equation
Q(gc,f)=Q(gs,f,α) and φQ2 as the solution to equation Q(gp,f)=Q(gs,f,α).W e
have that, if φ<φ Q1 then gc is the network which maximizes aggregate production.
Aggregate production is increasing with the number of collaborations. If φ ∈ (φQ1,φ Q2)
then gs is the network which maximizes aggregate production. Finally, if φ>φ Q2 then
gp maximizes aggregate production. So, when spillovers are large, intermediate levels of
collaborations maximize aggregate production of the industry. Notice that if spillovers
are small, aggregate production is increasing with the spillover parameter φ. But, when
spillovers become large, aggregate production is decreasing with φ,e x c e p tf o rgp.I nc a s eo f
unionization, aggregate production is increasing with the number of collaborations except
for very large spillovers. Finally, notice that total eﬀective R&D and aggregate unions
rents have a shape very close to the plot of the aggregate production.
3.4 Eﬃcient networks
We now examine social welfare under the diﬀerent networks. To compute social welfare
W(g) under a network g we substitute equilibrium quantities and proﬁts in the social
welfare expression (9). These computations are given in the appendix. We say that a
network g is eﬃcient if and only if W(g) ≥ W(g ) for all g . I nF i g u r e1 4w ep l o tt h e



















gc gsH1L gsH0L gp ge
Figure 10: Total proﬁts when ﬁrms settle wages.


















gc gsH1L gsH0L gp ge
Figure 11: Total proﬁts when unions settle wages.




























gc gsH1L gsH0L gp ge
Figure 12: Aggregate production when ﬁrms settle wages.



























gc gsH1L gsH0L gp ge
Figure 13: Aggregate production when unions settle wages.
29welfare levels under the diﬀerent networks without unions. Deﬁne φ as the solution to
equation W(gp)=W(gc). The ﬁgure shows that φ exists and is unique: φ =0 .6305.W e
are ready to state the following proposition (see the Appendix for details).
















gc gsH1L gsH0L gp ge
Figure 14: Social welfare when ﬁrms settle wages.
Proposition 7 Suppose ﬁrms settle wages. If spillovers are weak, φ<φ, then the com-
plete network gc is the unique eﬃcient network. If spillovers are strong, φ>φ, then the
partially connected network gp is the unique eﬃcient network.
The above result shows that the welfare-maximizing number of collaborations declines
with respect to the spillover parameter. For low spillover parameter φ,t h ec o m p l e t en e t -
work gc is eﬃcient. But for large spillover parameter, φ>0.6305, the partially connected
30network gp is eﬃcient. It is eﬃcient because when spillovers are large, the isolated ﬁrm
tends to be pushed out of the market and the collaborating ﬁrms will obtain proﬁts close
to the duopoly case which are greater than those obtained in the complete network where
all ﬁrms have equal market share. Moreover, consumer surplus is also maximized with the
partially connected network when spillovers are large. The reason is that the increase in
eﬀective R&D output by the collaborating ﬁrms results in an increase in their output that
more than compensate the reduction in the isolated ﬁrm’s output. The partially connected
network is the only network where the collaborating ﬁrms are able to reduce drastically
the rival’s market share when spillovers are very large.
Deﬁne φ0 as the solution to equation W(gp)=W(gs,α=0 ) . The ﬁgure shows that
φ0 exists and is unique: φ0 =0 .526.
Corollary 1 Suppose ﬁrms settle wages. If spillovers are weak, φ<φ 0, then social welfare
is increasing with the number of collaborative links.
Notice that, only if spillovers are weak, φ<φ 0, then social welfare is increasing with
the number of collaborative links whenever ﬁrms settle wages. Indeed, when spillovers are
strong, intermediate levels of collaborations are preferred from a social point of view.
Figure 15 contrasts the eﬃcient and pairwise stable networks. We observe that a con-
ﬂict between pairwise stability and eﬃciency may occur when ﬁrms settle wages. Mean-
while the eﬃcient network is always pairwise stable, the reverse is not true. For instance,
the partially connected network may be stable when the complete network is eﬃcient, and
the complete network is stable when the partially connected network is eﬃcient. Notice
that there is always a unique eﬃcient network.
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
complete is always pairwise stable
pairwise stable
partial network is not
pairwise stable
partial network is
φ ￿ φ(α) ￿ φ(0) ￿ φ(1) 01
||
||
complete is eﬃcient partial is eﬃcient
φ
Figure 15: A conﬂict between stability and eﬃciency when ﬁrms settle wages.
This conﬂict is much stronger when we consider the notion of strongly stable network.
The eﬃcient network may not be strongly stable. More precisely, the complete network
is the eﬃcient network for φ<φ =0 .6305 but the complete network is never strongly
31stable. However, if φ ≥ φ then the partially connected network is the eﬃcient network
and is the unique strongly stable.





φ ￿ φ(α) ￿ φ(0) ￿ φ(1) 01
||
||
complete is eﬃcient partial is eﬃcient
φ
Figure 16: A conﬂict between strong stability and eﬃciency when ﬁrms settle wages.
We turn now to the case where unions settle wages. In Figure 17 we plot the welfare
levels under the diﬀerent networks with unions. We observe that the complete network
gc is the eﬃcient network. Moreover, social welfare is increasing with the number of
collaborative links (see the Appendix for details).
Proposition 8 Suppose unions settle wages. The complete network gc is the unique ef-
ﬁcient network and social welfare is increasing with the number of collaborative links:
W∗(gc) >W∗(gs) >W∗(gp) >W∗(ge).
That is, whenever unions settle wages, there is no conﬂict between stability and ef-
ﬁciency. The complete network gc i sb o t ht h eu n i q u ep a i r w i s es t a b l en e t w o r ka n dt h e
eﬃcient network. It is also the unique strongly stable network. Thus, unionization recon-
ciles the private incentives to form R&D collaborations with the social welfare viewpoint.
Comparing the equilibrium expressions for social welfare, we could be tempted to
conclude that unionization reduces "social welfare". However, we have to be very cautious
with such conclusion because our measure of social welfare does not take into account
labour rents.
4C o n c l u s i o n
We have developed a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how unions will af-
fect the stability and eﬃciency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry
with three ﬁrms. We have found that, whenever ﬁrms settle wages, the complete network
is always pairwise stable and the partially connected is stable if and only if spillovers
are large enough. However, the complete network is the eﬃcient network if spillovers are

















gc gsH1L gsH0L gp ge
Figure 17: Social welfare when unions settle wages.
33small, while the partially connected network is the eﬃcient network if spillovers are large.
Thus, a conﬂict between stability and eﬃciency may occur: eﬃcient networks are pairwise
stable, but the reverse is not true. Strong stability even reinforces this conﬂict. But, once
unions settle wages such conﬂict disappears: the complete network is the unique pairwise
and strongly stable network and is the eﬃcient network whatever the spillovers.
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Appendix A: Empty network
In the last stage of the game, the R&D collaboration links have already been chosen,
the wage levels have already been determined and the research eﬀorts have already been
chosen. Under Cournot competition the ﬁrms compete by choosing simultaneously their
outputs to maximize proﬁts with price adjusting to clear the market. The unique Nash





(a −c +3 xi − xj − xk), i ∈ N,





(a −c − 3wi + wj + wk +3xi − xj −xk), i ∈ N,
if the union settles the wage. The symbol f (u) indicates that the ﬁrm (union) chooses
the wage. In the third stage, wages are settled at the ﬁrm-level. We have w∗
i(ge,f)=0 .





(7(a −c)+1 3 xi −3(xj +xk)).










(21(a − c) +151xi −9(xj +xk)) ·
(21(a −c) −73xi −9(xj +xk)),
It follows that marginal beneﬁts from R&D are decreasing with the research outputs from













Then, xi and xj are strategic substitutes. Moreover, we observe that marginal beneﬁts
from R&D are decreasing less with the research outputs from the other ﬁrms when unions
settle wages; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
∂Πi(ge,f)
∂xi∂xj
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ >
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
∂Πi(ge,u)
∂xi∂xj
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.
In the second stage, the ﬁrms choose simultaneously their research outputs to maximize
proﬁts anticipating perfectly wages and outputs. The unique (symmetric) Nash equilib-









, i ∈ N.
Since there is no collaboration, ﬁrm i’s own R&D output is its eﬀective R&D output. One
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Appendix B: Partial network
35Let k be the ﬁrm which is isolated and has no link. Firm i and ﬁrm j are linked
to each other, and share R&D activities. The unique Nash equilibrium of the Cournot










(a −c +3 xk −(xi + xj)(1 + φ)),










(a −c − 3wk + wi +wj +3xk −(xi +xj)(1 + φ)),
if the union settles the wage.
In the third stage, wages are settled at the ﬁrm-level. We have w∗
i(gp,f)=w∗
k(gp,f)=










(7(a − c)+1 3 xk − 3(xi +xj)(1+φ)).










































































Notice that R&D eﬀorts for the collaborating ﬁrms canbe either strategic substitutes or
complements depending on the spillovers parameter φ. However, the strategic interaction
between R&D eﬀorts of a collaborating ﬁrm and the isolated one (or the opposite) is of
substitution regardless spillovers size and unionization. Moreover, we observe that: (i)
marginal beneﬁts from R&D for the isolated ﬁrm is decreasing more with R&D done by
a collaborating ﬁrm than marginal beneﬁts from R&D for the collaborating ﬁrm do with












(ii) Marginal beneﬁts from R&D for a collaborating ﬁrm are decreasing more with R&D












(iii) Marginal beneﬁts from R&D for a ﬁrm are decreasing much more with R&D done by













In the second stage, the ﬁrms choose simultaneously their research outputs to maximize
proﬁts anticipating perfectly wages and outputs. Invoking symmetry for the ﬁrms linked
to each other, i.e. xi = xj, the unique Nash equilibrium of this stage game is
x∗
i(gp,f)=





2 (a − c)




6003(13 −3φ)(a − c)
1117225− 9027φ(10 − 3φ)
, x∗
k(gp,u)=
117(667 −9φ(10 −3φ))(a −c)
1117225 −9027φ(10− 3φ)
.
We observe that research eﬀorts are decreasing with spillovers (φ) when the union
settles the wage. That is,
∂x∗
i (gp,u)
∂φ < 0 and
∂x∗
k(gp,u)
∂φ < 0. In case the ﬁrm settles the wage,
research eﬀorts made by the isolated ﬁrm k are always decreasing with φ, while research
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1117225 − 9027φ(10 −3φ)
, q∗
k(gp,u)=





(7 −φ)(1+ φ)(a −c)
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(13− 5(2 − φ)φ)2 ,
Π∗
i(gp,u)=
4004001(151 − 9φ)(73+ 9φ)(a −c)
2
(1117225 − 9027φ(10 −3φ))2 ,
Π∗
k(gp,u)=
99207(667 −9φ(10 −3φ))2 (a −c)
2




1117225 −9027φ(10 − 3φ)
, w∗
k(gp,u)=
448(667 − 9φ(10− 3φ))(a − c)
1117225− 9027φ(10 − 3φ)
.
The global eﬀective R&D eﬀort is given by
X∗(gp,f)=
(9 −(2 −φ)φ)(a −c)
13 −5(2 − φ)φ
,
X∗(gp,u)=
9(26013 +1217φ(10 −3φ))(a −c)










150528(667 −9φ(10 −3φ))2 (a −c)
2
(1117225 −9027φ(10− 3φ))2 .
Appendix C: Star network
Let i be the "hub" ﬁrm linked to the "spoke" ﬁrms j and k. The unique Nash equi-





















(2(a −c) −6wj +2(wi +wk)+xj(6 −(2 +α)φ) −xi(2 −4φ)
−xk(2 + (2 − 3α)φ)).
In the third stage, wages are settled at the ﬁrm-level. We have w∗
i(gs,f)=w∗
j(gs,f)=0 .










(14(a −c)+xj (26 − 3(2 + α)φ) − xi(6 − 20φ) −xk (6 +(6 −13α)φ)).


























































In the second stage, the ﬁrms choose simultaneously their research outputs to maximize





i(gs,f,α =0 ) . Invoking symmetry for the ﬁrms at the spokes, i.e.
xj = xk, the unique Nash equilibrium of this stage game is
x∗
i(gs,f,1) =
(3 −2φ)(4+3φ(8− 3φ))(a − c)




6(2− φ)(1+φ(5 −2φ))(a −c)




9(13 −6φ)(2668 + 27φ(32 −9φ))(a −c)




18(26 −9φ)(667 +9φ(19 − 6φ))(a − c)




(3 −2φ)(1+φ(7 −2φ))(a −c)




(3− φ)(1+φ(5 −2φ))(a −c)




9(13− 6φ)(667 + 9φ(29 −6φ))(a −c)




9(13− 6φ)(667 + 9φ(19 −6φ))(a −c)
1117225 +27φ(9505− 6φ(496 −9φ(13 − 2φ)))
.










∂φ < 0 and
∂x∗
j(gs,u,0)
∂φ < 0.I n c a s e




∂φ < 0 and
∂x∗
k(gs,f,1)
∂φ < 0; but the research eﬀort made by the "hub" ﬁrm may
39increase or decrease with φ depending on how large spillovers are. As φ goes from zero to
one, research eﬀort ﬁrst increases with φ, then it starts to decrease with φ.
One can easily obtain the equilibrium outputs, proﬁts, and wages:
q∗
i(gs,f,1) =
4(4 + 3φ(8 −3φ))(a −c)




16(1 +φ(5 −2φ))(a −c)




4(1+ φ(7 −2φ))(a −c)




4(1+ φ(5 −2φ))(a −c)




(7 −2φ)(1 + 2φ)(4+3(8− 3φ)φ)
2(a −c)
2




2(14 − 3φ)(2 +3φ)(1+(5−2φ)φ)
2(a −c)
2




(7− 2φ)(1 + 2φ)(1+(7−2φ)φ)
2(a − c)
2




(7− φ)(1 + φ)(1+(5− 2φ)φ)
2(a −c)
2
(13 + φ(71 −2φ(20 −φ(9 −2φ))))
2 ,
when ﬁrms settle wages, and
q∗
i(gs,u,1) =
336(2668 +27φ(32 − 9φ))(a − c)




1344(667 + 9φ(19 −6φ))(a −c)




336(667 +9φ(29− 6φ))(a − c)




336(667 +9φ(19− 6φ))(a − c)




3(151 −18φ)(73 + 18φ)(2668 +27φ(32 −9φ))2(a −c)
2
(4468900 +9φ(94000 −9φ(3533 −6φ(191 −36φ))))2 ,
Π∗
j(gs,u,1) =
6(302 −27φ)(146 + 27φ)(667 +9φ(19 − 6φ))2(a −c)
2
(4468900 +9φ(94000 − 9φ(3533 − 6φ(191− 36φ))))2 ,
Π∗
i(gs,u,0) =
3(151 − 18φ)(73 + 18φ)(667 +9φ(29 − 6φ))2(a −c)
2
(1117225 +27φ(9505 −6φ(496 −9φ(13− 2φ))))2 ,
Π∗
j(gs,u,0) =
3(151 − 9φ)(73 + 9φ)(667+ 9φ(19 −6φ))2 (a −c)
2
(1117225 + 27φ(9505 −6φ(496 − 9φ(13 −2φ))))2 ,
40w∗
i(gs,u,1) =
448(2668 +27φ(32 − 9φ))(a − c)




1792(667 + 9φ(19 −6φ))(a −c)




448(667 +9φ(29− 6φ))(a − c)




448(667 +9φ(19− 6φ))(a − c)
1117225 +27φ(9505− 6φ(496 −9φ(13 − 2φ)))
,
when unions settle wages. The global eﬀective R&D eﬀort is given by
X∗(gs,f,1) =
(36 +φ(232 + φ(107 −18φ(15 −4φ))))(a − c)
52 + φ(264 −φ(169 − 6φ(15 −4φ)))
,
X∗(gs,f,0) =
(9 +φ(59 +6φ(4− φ)(1 − 2φ)))(a −c)
13 +φ(71 −2φ(20 − φ(9 − 2φ)))
,
X∗(gs,u,1) =
9(104052 + φ(162416 −3φ(13003 +54φ(191 −36φ))))(a −c)
4468900 + 9φ(94000 −9φ(3533 −6φ(191 −36φ)))
,
X∗(gs,u,0) =
9(26013 +φ(34519− 18φ(304+ 27φ(13 −2φ))))(a −c)





150528(2668 + 27φ(32 −9φ))2(a − c)
2
(4468900 +9φ(94000 −9φ(3533− 6φ(191 −36φ))))2,
U∗
j (gs,u,1) =
2408448(667 +9φ(19 − 6φ))2(a −c)
2
(4468900 +9φ(94000 −9φ(3533− 6φ(191 −36φ))))2,
U∗
i (gs,u,0) =
150528(667 + 9φ(29 −6φ))2 (a − c)
2
(1117225 +27φ(9505 −6φ(496 −9φ(13 − 2φ))))2,
U∗
j (gs,u,0) =
150528(667 + 9φ(19 −6φ))2 (a − c)
2
(1117225 +27φ(9505 −6φ(496 −9φ(13 − 2φ))))2.
Appendix D: Complete network











(a −c −3wi +wj + wk +3xi − xj −xk +2(xj + xk − xi)φ), i  = j  = k.
In the third stage, wages are settled at the ﬁrm-level. We have w∗



















(21(a − c)+xi(151 − 18φ) −3(xj +xk)(3− 10φ)) ·
(21(a −c) −xi (73 + 18φ) −3(xj +xk)(3− 10φ)),
i  = j  = k. It follows that marginal beneﬁts from R&D are decreasing with the research
outputs from other ﬁrms if and only if spillovers are small, or even smaller if unions settle

















































In the second stage, the ﬁrms choose simultaneously their research outputs to max-
imize proﬁts anticipating perfectly wages and outputs. The unique (symmetric) Nash




13 −4φ(1 − φ)
, x∗
i(gc,u)=
9(13− 6φ)(a − c)
1675 −36φ(5 −3φ)
, i ∈ N.
We observe that research eﬀorts are decreasing with spillovers (φ). Then, one can easily




13 −4φ(1 − φ)
, Π∗
i(gc,f)=







1675 − 36φ(5 − 3φ)
, Π∗
i(gc,u)=







1675 − 36φ(5 − 3φ)
.














Appendix E: Social welfare







(93− φ(112 −5φ(8 −(4 −φ)φ)))(a −c)2





3(31 + 4(3 −φ)φ)(a −c)2
(13 − 4φ(1 −φ))2 ,
where
A3 = 1488+ 224(77 − 4α)φ +16(2915 − α(367 −30α))φ2
−8(2784 + α(254 −α(241 −15α)))φ3
−(6816+ α(1216 −α(164 −3α(52 − 5α))))φ4
+4(2 +α)(496− (6 − α)α(8+ 3α))φ5
−4(2 +α)2(24− (8 − α)α)φ6.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose ﬁrms settle wages. Simple computations show that,
ﬁrst, the empty network is the less eﬃcient network: W∗(gc) >W∗(ge), W∗(gs) >W∗(ge),
and W∗(gp) >W ∗(ge). Second, if φ>φ 1 =0 .6035,t h e nW∗(gp) >W ∗(gs).T h i r d ,
W∗(gc) >W∗(gp) if and only if φ<φ 2 =0 .6305.L e tφ ≡ φ2. Fourth, if φ<φ 3 =0 .7112,
then W∗(gc) >W ∗(gs). Finally, (i) if φ>φ 4 =0 .788 then W∗(gs) >W ∗(gc); (ii) if
φ<φ 0 =0 .5258 then W∗(gs) >W∗(gp).













27(29839 + 108(13 − 3φ)φ)(a −c)2
(1675 − 36φ(5 −3φ))2 ,
43where
A4 = 444889 · 805653 − 816408 · 32607φ +108· 95229882φ2 −(4860 −729φ)155655φ3,
A5 = 212400685936 + 3[21344(2103265 −123182α)φ
−48(80720511 +α(41959273 − 10581098α))φ2
−216(17766080 +α(1157098 − 5α(192851 −17295α)))φ3
+81(4471392 + α(1050176 −5α(60524 +17580α −3459α2)))φ4
+8748(2 + α)(2064 − (6 − α)α(40 + 13α))φ5
−26244(2 +α)2(24 − (8 − α)α)φ6].
Simple computations lead to Proposition 8.
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